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This paper studies the dynamic effects offiscal policies in a simple perfect foresight
model with heterogeneous agents. To obtain an analytical solution, Long and Plosser's
(1983) functional form assumptions are combined with heterogeneous wealth levels and
consumption/leisure tastes. As a result, the aggregate consumption-leisure ratio depends
on the covariance of wealth shares and taste parameters. Policy effects decompose into
a "representative agent effect" as in Hall (1971) and Judd (1987) and a "distributional
effect" through changes of this covariance. Depending on how the covariance changes,
the two effects may have opposite signs. The distributional effect can dominate the
representative agent effect even ifwealth inequality changes little.
This paper substantially revises various parts of my dissertation (Wisconsin - Madison
1991). I am grateful to Robert Haveman, Martin David, and Peter Streufert for their
support and for invaluable suggestions. I would also like to thank Scott Freeman, Greg
Huffman, Evan Koenig and Ping Wang. The views and errors in this paper are my own
and do not reflect the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve system.1
Introduction
Much recent analysis of the effects of fiscal policies relies on models that ignore
heterogeneity, thus overlooking the redistributive effects of policies in the aggregate
economy and possibly leading to distorted inferences.1 For instance, because analysis
based on an intertemporal general equilibrium model typically assumes the existence of a
representative agent, the analysis will fail to detect the effects of a lump-sum transfer
from one agent to another or, for that matter, any other shock that alters the wealth dis-
tribution. As the overlapping generations model shows, if fiscal policies alter higher mo-
ments of the wealth distribution, a non-zero distributional effect will occur since hetero-
geneous marginal responses to changes in the wealth distribution do not cancel in the ag-
gregate. This is a critical insight behind non-neutrality results such as the failure of Ri-
cardian equivalence.2 Yet even overlapping generations models typically assume a rep-
resentative agent for each age cohort. The unspoken reason for ignoring heterogeneity
in macroeconomic models is that the repesentative agent assumption provides tractable
microfoundations (see Kirman (1992». However, the potential cost of this tractability is
aggregation bias and faulty conclusions about the dynamic effects offiscal policies.
To better understand this potential aggregation bias, I study the comparative
dynamic effects of fiscal policies when heterogeneous households are introduced into an
otherwise standard infinite horizon macroeconomic model. The model can easily be
embedded into an overlapping generations framework ala Blanchard (1985). Starting
with a simple perfect foresight model, diversity in initial full wealth levels and heteroge-
neity in preferences for consumption and leisure are introduced in a tractable way.
1 Examples using a representative agent framework are Hall (1971) and Judd (1985, 1987). Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) and Laitner (1990) are recent examples of fiscal policy analysis using an overlapping
generations model.
2 See for instance Aiyagari (1985) and Gilles and Lawrence (1986).2
Tractability is guaranteed by adopting Long and Plosser's (1983) functional form assump-
tions that are a popular benchmark for simulations.3 The functional form restrictions
also yield an ana-lytical solution for the comparative dynamics. Consistent with the
literature on exact aggregation, the assumed heterogeneity implies that the evolution of
aggregate variables depends on higher moments of the joint wealth and taste distribution.
In particular, the aggregate consumption-leisure ratio is found to depend on the covari-
ance of initial wealth shares and taste parameters. Fiscal policy shocks to the wealth
distribution feed back into the aggregate dynamics via heterogeneous wealth effects on
the consumption-leisure ratio. This leads to dynamics that appear to be anomalous when
viewed within the context of a representative agent model. For example, I find that
temporary shocks have long-run effects. This suggests that the aggregation biases of
ignoring heterogeneity may easily lead to distorted inferences about policy effects.
There are four disturbances considered in the present work: shocks to government
spending and shocks to taxes on labor, capital and consumption. The paper shows that
the total effect of any policy change decomposes into a "representative agent effect" and
a "distributional effect". The representative agent effect mirrors the effects found by
Hall (1971), Judd (1985, 1987) and others. Beyond this effect most fiscal policies have a
distributional effect by altering the covariance ofwealth shares and taste parameters.
Intuitively, with heterogeneous propensities for consumption and work, wealth effects do
not necessarily cancel in the aggregate. Since the distribution ofwealth is endogenous, I
show how fiscal policies alter initial wealth levels, wealth inequality, and the above-men-
tioned covariance. The paper focusses on how the efficiency (or representative agent)
effect and distributional effect of policies interact in determining steady-states and the
3 See for instance King et al. (1988a). Becsi (1991) shows that the main results of this paper carry
over to more general functional form specifications.4
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transition to steady-state. It is shown that the distributional and the representative agent
effects may have opposite signs, depending on how the covariance changes. Moreover,
analysis of the calibrated model shows that the distributional effect may dominate the
representative agent effect. This occurs even ifwealth inequality as measured by the
variance of wealth shares changes little.4
The present paper may be viewed as a contribution to the growing literature that
seeks to widen the scope of infinite horizon models. Lately, heterogeneity such as
borrowing constraints (Scheinkman and Weiss (1986», ex post heterogeneity (Atkinson
and Lucas (1991», ability-based models (Tamura (1991», and heterogeneous recursive
utilities (Benhabib et al. (1986» or discount rates (Becker (1981» have been incorpo-
rated into infinite horizon models. However, the dynamic effects of fiscal policies have
not received much attention in these models.5 This paper takes a framework similar to
that of Judd (1985, 1987) and looks more closely into dynamic distributional issues.
Moreover, it generalizes Blinder (1974) who analyzes the behavior oflong-run income
inequality within a parameterized "overlapping life-cycles" model in which factor prices
are exogenous and only a limited number of fiscal policies are considered.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section introduces
the model and describes the equilibrium solution. The second section computes the
model's comparative dynamics. After discussing the representative agent effects of
policies, this section calculates and discusses the effects on wealth and wealth inequality
and also compares the distribution and representative agent effects of policies. A third
This makes estimation of distributional effects difficult (see Blinder (1975)).
5 Although the public fmance literature has traditionally concerned itself with distributional issues, the
literature on the dynamic effects of fiscal policies (with infmitely-lived agents) has held to the representative
agent assnmption. Possibly this reflects the view -- in Lucas (1986) and King et aI. (1988b) -- that looking at
distributional issues adds little for the purpose of understanding aggregate dynamics. One of few exceptions,
Judd (1985b) looks at the dynamic incidence of capital taxes in a production economy with two classes of
infmitely-Iived individuals.4
section calibrates the model and simulates the economic effects of fiscal policy shocks.
Specifically, the size of the distributional effect and the size of the representative agent
effect are compared and how wealth inequality responds for anticipated permanent
policy shocks is examined. Finally, a conclusion briefly summarizes the findings of the
paper.
I, The Model
The model consists of three sectors. In the production sector a representative
perfectly competitive firm hires labor and capital services to produce a single con-
sumption good using a constant-returns-to-scale technology. The household sector has a
constant population (normalized to one) of infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents. Each
individual chooses feasible time paths for consumption, leisure and savings (in productive
capital and government bonds) to maximize intertemporally separable preferences. Type
i individuals differ in their leisure-consumption preferences and in their initial full
wealths; and ni is class i's share of the population. The government finances its expendi-
tures and lump-sum transfers by levying proportional taxes on consumption, wage and
interest income, or by issuing bonds. The tax instruments financing the time path of
expenditures satisfy an intertemporal revenue constraint.
The production sector is standard. In periods s (~1), a representative firm
combines current labor, hs' and the predetermined stock ofphysical capital, ks_ 1' to
produce a final good, Ys' The firm uses a Cobb-Douglas production function where Ys =
k~_1h;-o and 8 is the capital share parameter. Given its wage rate, ws' and interest rate,
rs' the firm's profits are maximized by choosing inputs to equate the marginal products of
both inputs with their factor costs. These first order conditions are: Ws = (1-0)(Ys/hs)
and rs+1 = 8(Ys+1/ks)' Capital is assumed to depreciate completely within each period5
The household sector is also standard except for heterogeneous tastes and
endowments. Each agent values consumption and leisure obtained in each period of an
infinitely-long life that starts in period one. Individuals' lifetime utility is defined as:
E pS-1[dln(c/) + (l-d)ln(l/)]
s2:1
(1)
where l~ € (0,1) and ~ denote, respectively, leisure (or non-market hours) and consump-
tion and h~ = 1 - ~ is the fraction of time used for market labor. The rate of time
preference, p€(O,l), discounts utility derived in future periods and reflects the agent's
impatience. A high value of the parameter ai means that the agent derives greater
utility from consumption relative to leisure than someone with a low value. In other
words, a high a i agent is a consumption-lover, while a lowai agent is a leisure-lover.
The representative individual chooses feasible time streams of consumption and
leisure that maximize lifetime utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. This
budget constraint requires that the discounted stream of purchases of consumption goods
and expenditures on leisure do not exceed initial full wealth:
(2)
Full wealth is defined as the initial endowment of capital and govermnent bonds plus the
after-tax present value of the lifetime stream offull labor income and government
transfers:
(3)
These equations are derived by time-aggregating agents' intratemporal revenue con-6
straints and then ensuring that agents' transversality conditions are satisfied.6
Individuals start their economic lives in period one with an endowment ofkj
shares of productive capital and bo
i units ofgovernment bonds. Over their lifetime, both
assets are perfect substitutes in the individual's savings portfolio and earn an after-tax
real rate of return in period s of (l-trs)rs' where the returns to savings are taxed at the
rate trs in period s. The product term in the definition of full wealth (or the present
value factor discounting from period s to period 1) is the period 1 price of period s
consumption. The period s pre-tax wage rate is given by Ws and iws is the period s tax
rate on wage income. The tax on consumption is given by tcs' and for simplicity, the
lump-sum transfer (or tax) is defined as a fraction t~ of total output Ys.7
Households choose streams of consumption and leisure that maximize (1) subject
to (2) given (3). This leads to the familiar (intratemporal and intertemporal) conditions
for constrained utility maximization:
(4)
(5)
In equation (4) the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is
equated to the relative price ofleisure. The Euler equation (5) sets the marginal rate of
6 In other words,
. , . . ... s .
(l+tcs)cs'+(k:+b;)=(l-tws)wjt;+(l-trs)rs(ks~l-+bS~l)+t;ys and lim IT ((l-tru)rurtxs' = 0,
S-+IXI u-l
for x = k, b were used to derive equations (2) and (3).
7 The virtue of the funclional form assumptions is that the analytical solution to the model can be
described by writing endogenous variables as fractions of output. Since the corresponding aggregates are
easily recovered, exogenous variables are described as fractions of output as an expositional shortcut.7
substitution between consumption in period sand s+1 equal to the period s+1 return
from reducing period s consumption by one unit.
The government finances its purchases of goods and its lump-sum transfers from
its tax revenues.8 The government's intertemporal revenue constraint is described by:
where bf is the amount of government bonds outstanding in period sand ys is the
fraction of total output, Ys' devoted to government expenditures. Tax revenues from
taxes on individuals' wage and interest income and consumption can be described as a
fraction, 'Ts' of output, Ys:
(6)





Finally, the goods, factor and asset markets are assumed to clear in all periods.
In particular, equilibrium in the goods and bond markets is given by:
'E.n ic i + k
, S s+YsYs=Ys (8)
(9)
where aggregate consumption will be defined by Cs == 1:; ni c/ Factor market equilibri-
8 I assume government spending does not enter utility or production functions. But the solution meth-
ods below apply also to preferences where government spending complements or substitutes for consumption
L pS-l[,hn(cs
i
+fl1"YsYs) + (I-d)ln(l/)], for flEe-I, 1),
S2:1
as well as production functions where government spending complements (or substitutes) for private inputs
Bk 8h 6
Ys • ks_/'s ("YsYs) T, 8k +8h +81 .1.8
urn implies ks = ~ ni ks
i and hs = ~ nih/ In this model, a perfect foresight equilibri-
um is defined as sequences of optimal household consumption, labor, and savings plans
and sequences of optimal firm output and input plans that perfectly forecast the time
path of all prices and government variables and clear goods, factor and asset markets.
The Model's Solution
The solution of this model can now be briefly described. Because preferences
are logarithmic, household optimization implies the individual household demands for
consumption and leisure are linear in initial wealth. Substituting equations (4) and (5)
into (2) yields:
These individual demands can be combined to form aggregate consumption and leisure.
Let Exy == Li n~Y be the aggregation (or averaging) operator and let Sxy == ~ ni(xi_
Ex)(yi_Ey) be the covariance operator, where ni represents the type i population share.
The terms "aggregate" and "average" are interchangeable, since the population size is
. .
constant and normalized to unity. Ifagent i's wealth share is defined by a' == z11/EZ'
individual demands are a time-invariant fraction of aggregate demands: cs
i = (a~/
Eaa)cs and 1/ = «l-ai)~/E(1-a)a)ls' where aggregate leisure is defined by Is == ~ nilsi
and Is= 1 - hs in equilibrium.
Substituting these relations into (4) and (5) yields aggregate household optimality9
conditions. Combining these conditions with the firms' optimality conditions yields
(11)
(12)
where the "distributional" term e == Eaa/ E(l-a)a = (Ea + Saa)/{I - (Ea + Saa)}
summarizes the inclusion ofheterogeneous tastes and wealth shares. The distributional
term e is the ratio of average after-tax (marginal wealth) propensities to consume goods
and leisure. Since an interior solution implies e > 0, the covariance of taste parameters
and wealth shares satisfies Saa € ( -Ea , I-Ea ). In particular, when either tastes or
wealth shares are equal across agents, Saa is zero. Identical tastes yield Long and
Plosser's representative agent model. While the unlikely case of identical wealth shares
also implies Saa= 0, the endogeneity ofwealth means that government policy shocks will
affect the covariance.
Heterogeneity in tastes and wealth implies that any policy shock will affect
aggregate demands through two wealth channels. The first channel through aggregate
wealth cancels for the representative agent and heterogeneous agent case, since the
model's time path depends on the ratio of aggregate consumption and leisure. When
tastes are not identical, the distributional term provides a second wealth channel by
which the government can influence the evolution of the economy. This channel arises
because changing the wealth share distribution alters Saa' Wealth share inequality tends
to increase when there is a mean-preserving spread ofwealth or when all agents are hurt
equally and average wealth falls. If Saa is positive initially, then on average consump-
tion-lovers are relatively wealthier than leisure-lovers. Thus, when wealth share inequali-
ty increases, consumption-lovers are made even more wealthy relative to leisure-lovers.10
Since heterogeneous wealth effects do not cancel in the aggregate, aggregate con-
sumption and labor rise in all periods. This is summarized by a rise of the distributional
term e. Alternatively, if the covariance is negative and inequality rises, rich leisure-
lovers become richer and aggregate leisure rises while e, consumption and labor fall.
Together with equation (8), equations (11) and (12) constitute a dynamic system
describing the evolution of aggregate consumption, capital and labor. One simple way of
finding a solution to this system is by positing a candidate division of output into con-
sumption, investment and government spending that also fulfills the aggregate optimality
conditions. Let X s denote the fraction of output less government spending that is
devoted to capital, or ks = x s(1-ys)ys' Then, from equation (8) Cs = (l-Xs)(l-ys)ys'







(1 -tws)(l -(J) e
(14)
where As is the leisure to labor ratio. These relations can be used to recursively com-
pute the equilibrium paths for output, prices, individual plans, private wealth and so on.
In particular, if one defines an "augmented" present value factor as the discounted
value of period s output, one can easily show that
SubStituting this definition into equation (2), individual wealth can be described by11
+ L 'lTA(1-tws )(1-0)(1 +As) +t/]
s;;,1
(15)
Also, equation (6), the government's revenue constraint, can be rewritten as
(16)
where,.s = \vs(1-0) + trsO + tcs(1-Xs)(1-ys) from equation (7).
A non-stationary closed-form solution is not easily characterized. It is assumed
that a X s solving the non-linear and non-stationary difference equation (13) exists.
However, a time-stationary solution to (13) is easily found: If (1 +tcs)(1-trs+1)/ (1+
tcs+1)(1-ys) = x, then X s = (Op)x. To complicate the search for an explicit solution, the
leisure-labor ratio, As' depends on X s and the distributional term e; and e in tum
depends on individual wealth which is a function of the time path of As and 'lTs' Rather
than characterize the dynamic system directly, I take an indirect approach below and
look at the comparative dynamics of this system around a steady-state that is unique
given the wealth distribution. A closed-form solution exists for the local dynamics.
II. Comparative Dynamics
I am now prepared to isolate the dynamic response ofthe system to each of the
fiscal instruments introduced above. Determining the comparative dynamics is a straight-
forward if laborious exercise in totally differentiating and solving the equations that
describe the dynamic equilibrium. This section will first compute the response of aggre-
gate variables holding the distributional term constant. After discussing the representa-
tive agent effect, I compute and discuss the distributional effect through changes in the
distributional term e. The distributional effect represents the aggregation bias that
results when a representative agent and Long and Plosser's functional forms are adopted.12
(The appendix provides explicit solutions for the equations and defined variables below.)
Representative Agent Effects
To simplify the exposition, only policy shocks over a connected time interval are
considered. Since all tax and spending shocks are analyzed separately, all shocks are
assumed to occur over the same time interval. And since the model is Ricardian (ie. the
timing of lump-sum transfers is irrelevent for aggregate activity if all agents are treated
equally), I assume without loss of generality that budget-balancing lump-sum taxes and
transfers occur over the same interval. Define an indicator function Is that is unity over
the time interval [S, T-I] and zero otherwise, where IsSsT-I and Tsoo. Then letting
dxs == Isdx for all policy variables x, one can show that the capital to consumption ratio
and the leisure to labor ratio evolve according to
dt, dt d -x.- + (I-X)(I -X.)_C + x.-.l
I-t, s l+tc l-y
(17)
tis = -(I-h)5..s' ~s = -e +Is dtw +(Xx.J dt, +/(I-X)Is +xX.) dtc -(IS+ xx.J dy
1-( I-v I-t \ l+t I-X l-y wAr C
(18)
where X. == (I-X):E Xv-1Is +v ~ 0 .
v;';1
According to equation (17), capital's share of output is independent of concurrent
(and past) fiscal policies. However, future increases of the share ofgovernment spending
or future reductions in capital or consumption taxes tend to tilt the composition of
current output from consumption towards investment. Wage taxes do not alter the
composition of output which only responds to anticipated policies via the intertemporal
Euler equation. From equation (19), labor rises at the same time the composition of
output shifts towards higher investment or when there is a rise ofwage taxes or the share13
of government spending.
s-l s-l
Letting K I == ~ (jv-1I 2: 0 and K X = ~ (jv-1Y 2: 0 one finds
s L..i s-v s - L..i ....ir-v '
v=O v=O
k ~ (1-h)(1-OS)e -(1-<P)KI) dtw _(1-<PX K X) dtr
s s 1-t 1-X s 1-t w r
(19)
Equations (17) and (19) can be used to derive expressions for changes in aggregate out-
Ys ~ (1-h)(1-OS)e -(1-<P)K/) dtw _(1-<PXKsX-~) dtr
1-t 1-X 1-t w r
and
( I) dtw 1 ( X) dtr Cs ~ (1-h)(1-OS)e - (1-¢)K - --(1-¢X)K -~-
s 1-t 1-X s 1-t w r
(20)
+(¢(1-X)K/-(1-<Px)Ks
X-(Is -~)) dtc + _1_(1-<PX)K;-¢(1-X)K/ -~) dy (21)
1~ 1~ 1~
Finally, perturbations to the capital-labor ratio (and factor prices) are derived by14
subtracting equation (18) from (20), since (- I-Or ;w ;)yA -h;0(1. l-h ).9 -0- s s s s s- s
Before computing the distributional effect, I discuss the representative agent effect
of the individual fiscal policies. Using the coefficients in equations (17) through (21), I
distinguish between two cases - a temporary one-period policy shock (or, S=T-l:2:1) and
a permanent shock (1:5:5< <T-+oo) announced in period 1. Evaluating the coefficients
from equations (17) through (21) one sees that labor taxes have the following effects.
Taxes on wage income lower the cost ofleisure over the interval [5, T-l] relative to
labor and consumption in all periods. As households substitute away from consumption
and labor towards leisure, output falls for periods s:2:S. Falling labor tends to raise the
net-of-tax wage rate and lower the equilibrium return to capital, thus, reducing capital
over the interval [5, T-l]. In the long-run, the capital-labor ratio returns to its original
steady-state level, because the after-tax interest rate is pegged by the fixed subjective
discount rate. Also, wage taxes have no anticipation effects for periods s ~5-1, because
capital depends on past expectations offuture policy movements through X s' This term
is independent ofwage taxes which do not enter the Euler equation.
Taxes on capital income reduce the return to capital and raise the price of
consumption and leisure in the interval [5, T-l] relative to other periods. Thus, from
equations (18) and (21), consumption and leisure rise in periods s~S-l and labor falls in
anticipation of this tax. Also, consumption rises relative to savings as demonstrated by
the fall of Xs and capital in periods preceeding the shock. Over the interval [5, T-1],
investment and capital fall in equation (19) to reduce households' tax burdens. The
9 When solving the local dynamics, King et al. (1988a) hold consumption and investment shares
constant and so find ks=cs=Ys when d1's ; O. Under constant-retnrns-to-scale technologies, this treatment
in effect fixes the capital-labor ratio along the transition path.15
decline in capital tends to raise the after-tax return to capital, lower the equilibrium
return to labor and cause labor to fall. Whether consumption rises or falls in the
interval [S, T-1] depends on whether T is finite or not. For periods in the interval [S, T-
1] there are two opposing effects on consumption that depend on the length ofthe
interval T-S. Intertemporal substitution means that consumption over the policy interval
falls relative to other periods. On the other hand, increasing consumption at the expense
of capital will lower the tax burden. IfT-S is small consumption tends to rise, but as T-
S grows the intertemporal substitution effect tends to dominate and households will tend
to reduce consumption. Finally, whether T is finite or not determines whether the
capital-labor ratio falls in the long-run, since the long-run after-tax interest rate is pegged
to the constant subjective discount rate.
A higher tax on consumption raises the price of consumption in the interval [S, T-
1] relative to consumption in other periods and relative to leisure in all periods. Accor-
ding to equations (18) and (21), the anticipatory effect of a future increase in consump-
tion taxes is that consumption and leisure rise and labor falls in periods ss S-1. Since a
higher cost of consumption is equivalent to a lower return to savings, households
increase consumption relative to savings in periods before the policy shock. Thus,
according to equations (17) and (19) Is and capital fall in periods prior to S; output in
equation (20) falls because labor and capital fall. In the policy interval, households
substitute away from consumption towards leisure causing labor to fall. Capital may rise
or fall in the policy interval: there are two conflicting effects on capital that depend on
the duration of the policy T-S. When T-S is small, households substitute away from con-
sumption towards savings for future periods when consumption is relatively cheap. But
as these periods grow further away, or T-S grows, households smooth consumption by
dissaving capital and raising early consumption more. In either case, reduced labor16
ensures a lower path of output.
Finally, increasing the government's share of output takes away resources from
the private sector, unless output can be increased by increasing private inputs. In
anticipation of the scarcity of resources, households shift away from consumption and
leisure towards savings and work effort in equations (17) through (21). This serves a
dual purpose: it smooths the path of consumption and leisure and it increases production
capacity when the policy takes effect. In the interval [S, T-l], households continue to
reduce consumption and increase labor, and shift the private share of output from
consumption to investment. However, ifthe duration of the policy is short (specifically,
T-S=l) capital and output will fall, while if the policy duration is long (or, T...."') capital
and output rise. This is because as the policy interval lengthens households are more
inclined to smooth consumption by raising output than through disinvestment.
Equations (18) through (21) show that aggregate quantities are permanently
affected by shocks to the distributional term c, while the distributional effect on factor
prices is transient. Thus, preference heterogeneity produces persistent policy effects in
the aggregate quantity measures; and distributional effects alter the correlations between
factor prices and aggregate quantities that are commonly predicted by representative
agent models. This is clearly seen, for instance, by looking at the long-run effects of
temporary policies (with finite T). From the above equations one can easily show that
koo =c oo =h oo =Yoo =(I-h)e and that the change of the capital-labor ratio is zero in the
limit. Thus, in contrast to Judd's (1987a) discussion, temporary fiscal policies have long-
run consequences (as long as the distributional effect is not zero). In other words,
preference heterogeneity introduces persistent effects for otherwise temporary policies.
Wealth and Distributional Effects17
To derive the distributional effect t requires several steps. First, uncompensated
perturbations of individual wealth are derived. Then the distributional effect through
compensated wealth changes is computed. Finally, the government's intertemporal reve-
nue constraint is used to detennine budget balancing lump-sum compensations. These
lump-sum disbursements are then used to find the compensated changes ofwealth. How
wealth inequality is affected is also derived.
To find the net effect of the disparate general equilibrium effects on wealth,
define the transform functions P;;= ~ pS, pl ;;= ~ pSI , pX;;= ~ pSY. Then
~s~l LJs~l s ~s~l ~~
normalizing the initial steady-state level of output to Yo = 1, the uncompensated effects
on individual and aggregate wealth are described by
i A dtw i dt, i dte i dy ..J i dZl = -(E E(l )e +Z -- +Z __ +Z -- +Z __ +rdt
z -aU w 1-( , I-t e l+t "/1-y
w , e
A dtw dt, dte dy E i..J i
= -(EzE(l-a)u)e +Zw--+Z,-- +Z __ +Z -- + . n rdt
I-tw I-t, e l+te "/l-y
where Zx;;=E n iZ;, and Zw = -(1-8)(1-tw)pl as well as
(1 -x)Z/ ;;= [(1-0)(l-tw) +( i KL\>p - xpx) +[(1-0)(1-tw)A]L\>P
Zei ;;= (l-X)(Z/ -[(1-0)(l-tw) +t i]pl) = -(l-X)Z,,/i
Thus, consumption taxes and government spending have opposite effects on wealth.
Subtracting equation (22) from (23) yields differential wealth effects




Labor taxes only have a (negative) direct effect on full wealth, while consumption
taxes and government expenditures only have indirect effects through changes in the aug-
mented present value factors and via changes of the wage-output ratio. Capital taxes
have a both a direct and a negative indirect effect on wealth. From the appendix where
the z".l are calculated for equations (22) and (23), one can show that increasing capital
or consumption taxes or decreasing government spending will increase wealth when S=1.
But as S grows, it is more and more likely that the effect on full wealth is negative. In
other words, only if S is small do policy effects on wealth through changes of A.s domi-
nate effects through changes in 'ITs. The policy duration, T-S, determines when the policy
effects switch signs: the policy effects on wealth tend to switch signs earlier when T-S
rises.lO The differential effects in equation (24) reflect changes in the augmented
present value factors that alter present value of heterogeneous endowment streams.
(Although not modeled explicitly, the endowment streams can be interpreted to include
heterogeneous wage profiles.) Higher capital or consumption tax rates or lower govern-
ment spending tends to lower present value factors (since even Dr tends to be negative).
Assuming that lump-sum compensations balance the government's intertemporal
revenue constraint, the distributional effect (for equations (18) through (21)) is
(l-h)t= I-h (Eni(c1-Ea)P!dti+SatJDr dtr +Dc dtc +D-y dY ))
Efi(l-e:t)aEz 'l l-(r 1+tc l-y
(25)
10 Using the parameter assumptions of the next section in the expressions for Zr' Zc' and Zx(a1so see
the appendix), one can easily calculate the critical S when these terms change signs. For a one period shock,
Zr > 0 as long as S,,5, while Zc > 0 and Zx < 0 as long as S,,4. For a permanent policy shock the
critical S falls: ~ > 0 as long as S"2, while Zc > 0 and Zx < 0 only ifS=1.19
and the compensated change ofaverage wealth
dEz = -....!..-(". n i(cJ -Eaypldt i +Sal~D, dt, +Dc dtc +Dl' dy ]]
E £..Ji 1-t 1+t 1-y a , C
EauP( dt, dtc dy ] +-- C --+C __+C --
E '1-t c1+t 1'1-y a , c
(26)
Finally, a natural measure of wealth share inequality for this model is the variance
of wealth shares, Suu' which is the coefficient of variation squared.ll Since
(
E ]dS . ...J' (dt dt dy ] -.!. --!!!!.. = ". n 'drdt I +S P D __ ' +D _c_ +D __ -dE
2 S £..Ji at '1-t c1+t 1'1-y z aa r c
(27)
Thus, equations (25) through (27) decompose into two parts. The first part is the effect
of differential changes in wealth levels. The second part involves equal absolute changes
in wealth levels that lead to non-proportional changes in wealth shares.
To illustrate the interplay of the last three equations, consider the case of a lump-
sum transfer from a rich consumption-lover (leisure-lover) to a poor leisure-lover (con-
sumption-lover). Thus, Sau >(<) 0 initially. Ifthe ni are equal, the transfer causes a
negative (positive) distribution effect, a rise (fall) of average wealth, and a negative
(ambiguous) effect on wealth inequality. Intuitively speaking, when Sau < 0 initially,
redistribution from individuals with a low propensity to consume and a high propensity
11 The Herfmdahl index, E"", is cardinally equivalent to the variance of wealth shares, since E"" = Soo
+ 1. The variance of wealth shares and the Herfmdahl index satisfy the Pigou-Dalton strong principle of
transfers (Cowell (1977)). Like the coefficient of variation, the Giui coefficient, EniI1 >i n j Id·JI'
where d < uJ whenever i < j, only satisfies the weak principle oftransfers. While the Gini coefficient is
very popular, I prefer computing changes of the variance of wealth shares for its simplicity.20
for leisure to agents with the opposite propensities causes aggregate consumption and
labor to rise for all periods - a positive distribution effect. As the supply oflabor rises,
wages are driven down which causes individual wealth levels to fall. Thus, transfers
from rich to poor cause a fall in average wealth. When individual wealth levels fall
equally, the wealth shares of the poor fall. Thus, wealth share inequality rises. The net
effect on inequality of a lump-sum redistribution is ambiguous, because the indirect
effects of a fall of average wealth works against the direct effect of the transfer. If
wealth is very unequal initially, wealth inequality may rise further.
What happens if capital or consumption taxes rise permanently or government
spending falls? As discussed above, this implies a contractionary representative agent
effect. Consider first the case where Sat and Sat are zero. The first assumption means
that the covariation of tastes for consumption and wealth shares is solely due to the
initial endowments of capital and government bonds. The second assumption means that
all of the variation in wealth shares is due to the initial endowment.12 These assump-
tions mean that differential effects are irrelevant. Since the compensated wealth effects
(the Cx defined in the appendix) ofthese policies are positive, individual wealth levels
rise equally but not equiproportionately. The wealth shares of those agents poorer than
average rise. Thus, the variance of wealth shares and wealth share inequality fall as
average wealth rises. Ifthe initial covariance of consumption tastes and wealth shares is
positive, then the wealth shares of poorer leisure-lovers rises and aggregate labor and
consumption fall. In other words, a negative distribution effect occurs that reinforces the
representative agent effect of these policies. Similarly, if this covariance is negative a
12 Ifx is defined as either a or ", then EzSxu =Sx(k.b) +PSxt, since steady-state wealth is
iii .
ZI = (ko+bo) +P(l-lw)(l-8)(l+A) +PI '.21
positive distribution effect occurs as the wealth share ofpoor consumption-lovers rises.
If Sat is still zero but Sat is positive, then differential wealth effects enter into the
calculation ofwealth share inequality. Since the differential effects of the above polices
are to lower the present value of the endowment streams, agents with lower than average
endowment streams to begin with, or ti < Et, experience a fall of their wealth share.
Thus, the differential effects increase wealth share inequality and offset the fall in
inequality due to compensated wealth effects. Ifthe endowment streams explain a large
part ofwealth share inequality, overall inequality may rise.
Finally, when Sat is not zero, differential wealth effects enter the calculation of
the distributional effect and the effect on average wealth. Permanently raising capital or
consumption taxes or lowering government spending has the differential effect of raising
wealth share inequality. Thus, if, for instance, Sat is positive, consumption-lovers with
high lump-sum transfer endowment streams gain. This in turn causes aggregate con-
sumption and labor to rise and a positive distribution effect that must be added to the
above distribution effects. Alternatively, if the covariance of consumption propensities
and endowment streams is negative, consumption-lovers lose and a negative distribution
effect ensues and aggregate labor and consumption fall. When Sat and Sew have the
same sign, differential and compensated wealth effects work in opposite directions in the
distributional effect; and when these covariances have opposite signs they work in the
same direction. At the same time, when the supply of labor rises (falls), wages and
average wealth fall (rise) in steady state. This change in average wealth tends to raise
(lower) wealth share inequality, thus, offsetting (reinforcing) the direct effect on
inequality from the differential effects.13
13 Embedding the model in Blanchard's (1985) overlapping generations framework weakens the wealth
and distributional effects, since the wealth effects depend positively on individuals' life expectancy. To see
(continued...)22
III. Numerical Exercises
In this section the model is calibrated and some numerical examples are then
computed. The simulations quantify how wealth inequality is affected by the various
fiscal policies and how large the distributional effect of a policy can be relative to the
representative agent effect. Using a priori information, parameters for the model are
chosen so that the calibrated initial steady state of the model is close to the long-term
averages for the U.S. economy.14 Special attention is paid to how sensitive the initial
steady-state, wealth inequality effects and the distributional effects are with respect to
the initial distribution of tastes and wealth shares. For simplicity, I only look at antici-
pated permanent shocks, specifically S = 4 and T ~ 00 are assumed. Policy effects are
calculated by parameterizing equations (18) through (21) and (25) through (27).
Since most variables in the model are described as shares of output, the initial
steady-state output is normalized to unity. The utility discount factor, P = .993, defines
the length of a period as a quarter of a year. This implies an average annual after-tax
and risk-free real rate of return of 2.8 percent. This is in line with estimates by McGrat-
tan (1991) and is slightly higher than the commonly used value of 0.99. Capital's share
in production, 0, is assumed to be 0.3. In simulations that use a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function 0 ranges from 0.25 in Judd (all) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) to 0.43
13(...continued)
this, let q be the time-invariant probability of surviving every period. Then, pq rather than p is used to
calculate the wealth effects of individuals. Thus, P is replaced by P[pq], px by pX[pq], Dx by Dx[pq] and so
on. However, the government budget effects are evaluated at q;l, ifthe government lives forever. Also,
the timing of budget-balancing taxes is very important in this non-Ricardian set-up. Further, it can be shown
tbat q does not enter the calculation of the representative agent effects in equations (17) through (21).
14 For reference, the following long-run averages over 1960 to 1989 were computed from the 1991
Economic Report of the President. Consumption expenditures (as a share of GNP) were 0.635, investment
Was 0.159, total government purchases were 0.202, transfers were 0.92, total tax receipts 0.302, net interest
paid was 0.029 and the total government deficit was 0.012. Also, the annual real return on Treasury Bills
averaged 1.39 percent, while Aaa Corporate Bonds were 3.19 percent.23
in King et al. (1988). McGrattan (1991) estimates a value of 0.434.
In the numerical examples below, I simulate the model's response to a ten percent
(balanced-budget) increase of all fiscal policy instruments from their initial steady-state
levels. The government sector is identified by te = 0.05, tw = 0.22, tr = 0.46, y = 0.203.
Estimates of marginal tax rates range from 0.2 to 0.4 for labor taxes and from 0.3 to 0.5
for capital taxes (see Hansson (1985) and Judd (1987a) for references). I assume that
the consumption tax rate is close to the sales tax rates reported in Ring (1989). Since 'I'
denotes total tax receipts less net interest payments, net interest payments are added to
transfers and Et=Iiniti = 0.133 is assumed. With the assumptions below, this implies
that the deficit including net interest payments is 1.3 percent of GNP. The above para-
meter assumptions imply that investment's share of output less government spending, X,
is O. 202. Also, the share of output that is invested, X(1-y), is 0.161 and the share that is
consumed, (I-X)(I-y), is 0.636.
There is little evidence on tastes for consumption relative to leisure. Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) assume for average tastes for consumption that E", = 0.4 to tie
down aggregate labor, h, while Blinder (1974) assumes E", = 0.33. However, E", does
not tie down h when the covariance oftastes and wealth sharesSao can vary. The term h
ranges from 0.4 in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) to 0.44 in Kydland and Prescott (1989)
for employed workers. For comparison, employed households are assumed to spend
between 40.1 and 45.0 percent of their substitutable time working in the original steady
state. Assuming that h=0.401 (h=0.45) implies that E",+ S",a = 0.45 (0.5) and that the
distributional term & = 0.82 (1.0). This also means that the representative agent case
occurs when E", = 0.45 (0.5) and that for all E", larger than this critical value Sao is
negative. There is not much evidence on the size or sign of S",a' Blinder (1974) pro-
vides anecdotal evidence that the covariance is positive in the U.S., while Menchik and24
David (1983) and Diamond and Hausman (1984) provide support for a negative covari-
ance. I focus on two cases: E" = 0.2 and S"" > 0 and E" = 0.8 and S"" < O. To my
knowledge, there is no evidence on the size or sign of S"t' the covariance of consumption
tastes and the endowment stream of lump-sum transfers. (Heterogeneity of this stream
of endowments can be interpreted as including heterogeneity ofwage profiles.) Thus, I
assume that PS"t/Ez = (0.75)S"u or else that PS"t/Ez = - (0.5)S"". In the fIrst case,
the endowment stream provides most of the variation in wealth shares. In the second
case, the covariation of the endowment stream is opposite to that of the initial endow-
ment of capital and bonds.
The above parameter assumptions imply that aggregate full wealth is 189.5 (210.6)
times the size of output for h=0.45 (for h=OA01). Only a small fraction of this number
is due to the initial capital and bond endowment: the rest is due to the endowment
stream. Since the steady-state wage stream and full wealth are inversely related to labor
supplied, choosing h lower than 0.4 would have implied even higher wealth. Also, the
variance of wealth shares, SUa' is assumed to be 6.5 which corresponds to a Gini coef-
ficient of about 0.56. Winnick (1989) reports population shares and mean net worths (in
1985 dollars) for six income groups in the U.S.l5 Based on this data, Suu was 6.83 and
the Gini coeffIcient was 0.565 in 1983. In 1986, Suu was 6.34 and the Gini coefficient
was 0.554. For comparison, Wolff and Marley (1989) report that the Gini coefficient for
their broadest measure of wealth was 0.59 in 1962 and 0.57 in 1983. Finally, Kessler and
Masson (1988) report that the size of Sat' the covariance ofwealth shares and endow-
ment streams in wealth, is unresolved. This question is related to the debate of what
percentage ofwealth is from bequests or life-cycle savings. For simplicity, I assume the
15 In 1983 the (ni, d)-pairs Were (0.226, 0.22), (0.261, 0.402), (0.183, 0.595), (0.211, 0.892), (0.088,
2.383), (0.022, 15.132). In 1986 the pairs were (0.24, 0.218), (0.256, 0.427), (0.186, 0.571), (0.21, 1.016),
(0.088, 2.553), (0.019, 15.28).25
endowment stream constitutes fifty percent of the variation ofwealth shares or that
PSat/Ez = (0.5)Saa = 3.25.
Figures 1a through 3d show how the size of the long-run distributional effect,
(I-h) ~, of permanent increases in capital and consumption taxes and government
spending depends on different combinations of E", and S",a' Also, the corresponding
percentage changes of the variance ofwealth shares from its initial value of 6.5 are
shown. As the average taste for consumption E", rises along the x-axis, S",a fails in order
to keep h fixed at 0.401 or 0.45. Figures 1a, 2a, and 3a graph the distributional effects
when PS"'t/Ez = (0.75)S",a and Figures 1c, 2c, and 3c graph the corresponding inequality
effects. By contrast, Figures 1b, 2b, and 3b assume PS",t/Ez = - (0.5)S",a' Table 1
summarizes the effects for four cases assuming either h=0.401 or h=0.45. In case A,
E",= 0.2 and S",a= 0.275, while for case B, E",= 0.8 and Sao= -0.325, where for both
cases PS",tlEz = (0.75)S",a' Alternatively, assuming PS",tlEz = - (O.5)S"'O' E",= 0.2 in
case C and E",= 0.8 in case D.
Government spending shocks are shown to have the largest distributional effects
followed by capital taxes and then consumption taxes. For the parameter assumptions of
Table 1, the distributional effect of a capital tax ranges from -2.67 percent to +1.03 per-
cent. The distributional effect of a consumption tax is much smaller ranging from -0.58
percent to +0.38 percent, while the distributional effect of a spending shock ranges from
-2.52 percent to +3.89 percent.16 The direction of the distributional effect is governed
by differential wealth effects that overwhelm the small compensated wealth effects.
Also, whether S",a is positive or negative affects the absolute size of the distributional
effect and the effect on wealth inequality discussed below. This asymmetry occurs be-
t6 For comparison, ifreal GNP is $5 trillion, a one percent distributional effect corresponds to a $50
billion annual change of real GNP.26
cause as S"", or the covariance ofwealth shares and consumption propensities, rises, &
and h rise which implies lower wages, lower wealth and a greater proportional change
for a given absolute change in wealth. When aggregate labor, h, is fixed, increasing Sau
requires a reduction of Ea , the average taste for consumption, and this in turn increases
the multiplier in equation (25) and (26) and magnifies the wealth effect. Thus, fiscal
policies have a proportionately stronger effect on aggregate wealth and larger distri-
butional and inequality effects when Saa > 0 or the larger h is.
To determine plausible ranges of changes to the variance ofwealth share, con-
sider the case Ea = 0.2 and compare this to where the percentage changes converge to
as Ea grows large in Figures 1 through 3. Thus, permanent capital taxes cause the vari-
ance ofwealth shares to change from -9.0 percent to -16.8 percent. For consumption
taxes wealth share inequality changes from -2.0 percent to -3.75 percent, while for a
permanent spending shock the range is +13.3 percent to +25.0 percent by this measure.
If fiscal policies are ranked according to how much wealth inequality changes, the rank-
ings are the same as for distributional effects. This ranking is partly explained by the
nature of the policy experiment. An across the board ten percent increase naturally
means larger effects the larger the initial level of the individual policy parameters. A-
nother reason is that capital taxes and government expenditures have larger present
value effects on wealth than consumption (and wage) taxes. Also, both rankings depend
on aggregate wealth effects. The effects through average wealth dominate the differen-
tial wealth effects if Sat is positive. The opposite is true when this covariance is negative.
Finally, unless Saa is very large (or Ea very small), permanent polices have moderate
effects on wealth inequalityP Fiscal policies have larger effects on inequality the larger
17 As a reference, the variance of wealth shares fell by approximately 7.2 percent from 1983 to 1986
using Winnick's (1989) data. This corresponds to a small fall of the Gini coefficient: from 0.565 to 0554.27
Saa or the smaller Ea. since initial wealth and the wealth multiplier tend to be larger.
Assuming h = 0.425, I simulate the aggregate effects of anticipated permanent
fiscal policy shocks. The graphs of the simulation (Figures 4a through 6d) contrast the
representative agent effect of policies with the total policy effect. The total effect adds
the distributional effect to the representative agent effect. The distributional effect is
computed for the parameter assumptions underlying cases A through D in Table 1 (eval-
uated at h=0.425). These cases yield bands around the representative agent effects that
can be thought of as a measure of possible aggregation bias. Choosing an Ea less than
0.2 or greater than 0.8 would have widened the region of potential bias.
Figure 4 shows the effects of an anticipated permanent future capital tax increase.
This has the representative agent effect ofincreasing consumption prior to the start of
the shock and then lowering it. Capital, labor and output fall in all periods. The simula-
ted long-run representative agent elasticity with respect to a permanent capital tax is
around -0.27 for consumption, -1.34 for capital, -0.12 for labor, and -0.49 for output. The
simulated long-run elasticity for the distributional effect ranges from -0.24 to +0.14.
This range is tighter the larger the average propensity to consume, Ea' As can be seen
from the graphs, the distributional effect can dominate the representative agent effect for
labor in all periods. The representative agent effect for consumption and output is likely
to be dominated only in the anticipation phase. The representative agent effect on capi-
tal is IJ?uch too large to be offset. Of all the policies coiIsidered, the representative agent
effect of a capital tax shock is least likely to be overwhelmed by the distributional effect.
An expected permanent consumption tax -- shown in Figure 5 -- has the represen-
tative agent effect of raising consumption and leisure prior to the shock and then lower-
ing consumption and labor. Capital and output fall in all periods. The simulated long-
run representative agent elasticities of the four graphed variables are small - approxi-28
mately -0.027 for capital, consumption, labor and output. This is mainly because the
initial tax rate is small. The simulated elasticity of a permanent consumption taxes'
distributional effect on all aggregate variables ranges from -0.053 to +0.034. The repre-
sentative agent effect is most likely to be offset if Sat is negative. In other words, the
offsetting influence is strongest if wealth from heterogeneous endowment streams (eg.
lump-sum transfer and/or wage profiles) is negatively correlated with consumption
propensities. This effect is magnified if Ea is smail and Sau positive.
Lastly (in Figure 6), an anticipated permanent increase of government spending
has the representative agent effect of reducing the consumption of goods and leisure and
raising investment and output in all periods. The baseline simulation finds that the long-
run representative agent elasticities are approximately +0.18 for labor, capital, and out-
put and -0.14 for consumption. The simulated long-run elasticity from the distributional
effect of a permanent government expenditure shock ranges from -0.23 to +0.35 for capi-
tal, consumption, labor, and output. The distributional effect offsets the representative
agent effect on consumption when, the covariance of consumption tastes and endowment
streams, S"'t' is negative. When S"'t is positive, the distributional effect tends to offset the
representative agent effect on capital, labor, and output. As can be seen in the graphs,
the distributional effect is largest when Ea is small. Had I chosen an E", less than 0.2,
the distributional effect would have easily dominated the representative agent effect.
To sum up, the distributional effect is most likely to overturn the representative
agent effect for a government spending shock. This is not surprising since these shocks
tend to have the largest wealth effects. More surprising is that the distribution effects of
consumption taxes are likelier than capital taxes to dominate the representative agent
effect. A consumption tax tends to have weaker wealth effects than capital taxes because
of smaller initial tax rates, but the wealth effects are not weak relative to the represen-29
tative agent effects. Also, a capital tax has a very large direct representative agent effect
on capital that is hard to offset while consumption is not as sensitive to the direct effects
of consumption taxes. Finally, the case for distributional effect overwhelming the repre-
sentative agent effect is probably stronger for temporary policy shocks, since the repre-
sentative agent effect gradually weakens returning the economy to the original steady-
state. The distributional effect is weaker for a temporary shock, but it does not dissipate.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper the traditional public finance concern with distributional issues is
combined with the dynamic analysis offiscal policies. I argue that distributional consid-
erations should not be dismissed out ofhand when analyzing macroeconomic policies.
Not only are they important for the study of equity effects, ignoring them by assuming a
representative agent leads to aggregation biases when computing the dynamic effects of
policies. That the aggregation biases are potentially significant points to the fragility of
insights derived from representative agent models. To show this a simple perfect fore-
sight model was developed where agents have heterogeneous preferences for consump-
tion and leisure and heterogeneous full wealth levels (due to differences in both the
initial endowments and the profile of future endowments). I find that the aggregate con-
sumption-leisure ratio depends on the endogenous covariance offull wealth shares and
propensities for consumption (or work). Thus, fiscal policies have distributional effects
through changes of this covariance that are not found in representative agent models.
Although the model's functional form assumptions are restrictive, they allow an
exact solution of the dynamic effects offiscal policies when agents are heterogeneous.
To compute the distributional effect of policies, I first calculate how fiscal policies affect
full wealth levels and full wealth inequality and find that the size and sign of uncompen-30
sated wealth effects -- without budget balancing lump-sum compensations -- depends
critically on when and how long a policy is enacted. An increase in capital or consump-
tion tax rates or a decrease in government spending tends to increase wealth levels if
there is very little anticipation time or the policy duration is short. But wealth levels will
fall the longer the anticipation time or policy duration. On the other hand, the compen-
sated (or, balanced budget) effect of such policies is to increase individual wealth levels.
This paper shows that such policies affect wealth levels equally but not equiproportion-
ately. The differential wealth effects of these policies occurs through negative present
value effects on the endowment streams that lower the wealth share of individuals with
below average endowment streams. Ifthe endowment stream is positively correlated
with total wealth, overall inequality will rise (or fall for a negative correlation).
I also show analytically that the sign of the distributional effect on aggregate
activity depends on how tastes for consumption and labor and the components of wealth
are distributed initially. For example, if the covariance of wealth shares and tastes for
consumption is positive, compensated wealth effects have a positive effect on activity.
But if the covariance of tastes and endowment streams is positive, differential wealth
effects cause a negative distributional effect. Simulations of the model show that the lat-
ter effects dominate. Thus, the distributional effect of higher capital or consumption tax
rates or lower government spending counteracts (reinforces) the contractionary represen-
tative agent effect for a negative (positive) covariance of tastes and endowment streams.
Numerical computations suggest that the distributional effects of spending shocks and
consumption taxes probably overwhelm the representative agent effects. The distribu-
tional effects of capital taxes are less likely to dominate, since they have large direct ef-
fects on investment. The simulations of the model are, also, consistent with the stylized
fact that wealth inequality moves little over time, even with large distributional effects.31
Appendix
Represenlative AgenlEffects
Totally differentiating equations (13) and (14) and solving the resulting difference equations forward
yields
A _ (1 ) ~ v-I [ dlrs+ v dles+ v-I -dles+ v d'YS+v] Xs - -x ~ X ---+ +--
v>:1 l-Ir 1+Ie 1,
h
A = -(I-h); A _ A dlws dIes d'Ys X A





where ~ denotes dx./x evaluated at the initial steady-state value. The above equations describe dynamic
effects for any time path offiscal policy shocks. Solving these equations out and inserting ~ as well as
5 :ss:sT-l (A3)
o s2:T
yields equatious (17) and 18).
Equations (17) and (18) are are useful in deriving equations (19) through (21). After totally diffe-
rentiating the equilibrium production relationship, Ys= [(I-Xs-I)(I-'Ys-I)Ys-118~-6, iterate backwards and
substitute for it . Collecting X
A terms and letting 1-<f>"'(I-h)(HI), one can show that
S S
s-1 [ [ ddt] ] - _ V A IW e d'Y 1 -</>X A
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Using the following expressions then yields equations (19) through (21):























Wealth and Distributional Effects
Totally differentiating full wealth yields
dz; = ~:>s [(I-tw)(I-6)(1+A)[~'\s- Is dtw +1Tsl +dts
i +t i1TS]
Yo s><l I +A l-tw
This expression can be solved with the help of
(A7)
XXs-Xo d"ls dtcs frs = +-----
I-x I, l-te
=_(Xx.-Xo) dt, +(Xo-xX.-(l-x)I) dte +(XXs-Xo +1] d"l (AS)
I-x I -t, s I +Ie I-x s I,
and equation (18) which capture the policies' indirect effects on wealth. Note that raising capital or
consumption taxes or reducing government's share of output increases As in periods sST-I and thus raises
wealth. After T, these policies have no effect on wealth through this channel. By contrast, these policies
lower "'s for periods sSS-I. During the policy interval IS, T-Il, a one-period positive shock to capital taxes
will raise ".S' but a permanent shock will lower".s. This is because the shorter the policy duration is, the
more likely it is that the direct effect of capital taxes on after-tax interest rates will outweigh the indirect
effect through changes in net of tax interest rates. By contrast, an increase in consumption taxes or a
decrease in government expenditures will lower "'s in periods s E IS, T-Il. This occurs because there are no
direct effects on after-tax interest rates.
To derive the distributional effect, 'l: = (E,..,E(I-apr1dS_ use the fact that dSau = (EJ-\dS", -
SaudEz) and dSaz ~ En i(<1-Ea)(dz1
i-dEz) to yield
(AIO)33
Substituting this expression into equation (23) yields
_ 1 '\"' i' .J i S",P [dt, dte d"( ) dEz---LJin (a'-Ea)r-dt --- D,_+De-_+D1-
~ ~ 1~ 1~ 1,
E [dt dt dt d~ '_I ,) -~ Zw~+Zr_r+Zc_ c +Z",_l+I:;n'Fdt'
Ea 1--tw 1--t, 1-tte 1,
Ifall fiscal policy changes are required to balance the government's intertemporal revenue
constraint, then applying the method for deriving equation (23) to equation (16) yields
(All)
(Al2) dt dt dt d~ '_1' o =dbo
g =Z ~+(Z-PC)_' +(Z _PC)_e +(Z -PC)_' +~,n'r-dt' w1--t ' r 1--t C c1-tt 1 11 ~ w r c.-y
where (1-X)PC, =PCc =-(1-x)PC1 =P(1-ttc)(1-X)(1,) 1+£Xo >0. Note that to derive this equation. it
£
is helpful to rewrite the steady-state deficit as "( +E,-T = (1--tw)(1-Q) +E,) +8(1--t,) - (1,)(1+tc(1-x»)'
To compute uncompensated, differential and compensated wealth effects, some building blocks are
developed. The transform functions P, pI, and pX defmcd in the text have the solutions p = p/(1-p) and
pi=pS-l(t_pT-S)p. Substituting (A3) into pX ..1:"1 P'X; implies
( )
S-1 [ ) S-I-; T-l T-l
pX=1-xT-S pS-IE ~ +EP'_pT-I E
swl p s-s s-s







Note that the last two equations correspond to the differential effects defined in equation (24).
Using these building blocks to find the uncompensated wealth effects in equations (22) and (23),
first, reproduce the coefficients from equation (23):
(l-X)Z,'"M(XoP -XPX) +NXoP, Zc '" (l-X)(z, -Mt) = -(l-X)Zy
where, to save space, M"(1-8)(I-t,..) +Ep N" (1-8)(I-t,..). =(1 +t.,)(I-X)(I-Y)~.
Solving these terms out yields:
(1-;)P-1(1-x)Z, = (M(l-X)+N(1-;))h -xT-S)xfi-1- (;) M(l--x)h-pT-S)pS-l
(1-;) p-1Zc = (M(l-X)+N(1-;))h -xT-S)xfi-1-M(l-x)(l-pT-S)pS-l




(A20) PC, '" (I,)[(1-;)(Xop-xPX) +(I-X)(I;'(l+(c) -1) XoP +(I-X) ; pI]
from which (with the building blocks defined above) it is straightforward to derive the terms in equation
(AU).35
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